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The Supreme Court shapes constitutional and statutory meaning in an era defined by rapid technological change. But, despite presiding over disputes that involve online conduct, the court itself is strikingly absent from that world. This absence is especially notable in social media. Can – or should – the court continue to remain so disconnected?
This is not idle speculation. Across the globe, high courts have begun to embrace social media as a tool for transparency and civic engagement, offering real-time updates, summaries of their decisions, and direct communication with the public. By contrast, our Supreme Court continues to rely on traditional methods – written opinions, limited audio of oral arguments, transcripts, and occasional public appearances – to convey its work. At the same time, the justices have acknowledged the profound influence of digital platforms on speech, governance, and public perception and have expressed concerns about misinformation and the real-world harms that can stem from online ignorance.
The court needs to bridge this gap. To so, it should adopt a semi-limited, institutional approach to things like social media – using official, nonpartisan channels to communicate clearly with the public while preserving judicial neutrality, in a manner comparable to how some state court judges have used their platforms in furtherance of their official duties. This model would enhance transparency and accessibility without exposing individual justices to the risks associated with certain kinds of online engagement. In other words, the judiciary should recognize that thoughtful participation – not complete disengagement, as is the case now – is the best path forward. And it should do so sooner rather than later.
SCOTUS’ mixed relationship with social media
The Supreme Court maintains a striking institutional distance from social media. As far as we know, none of the nine sitting justices operate public personal accounts on platforms like X, Facebook, or Instagram, a choice that reflects longstanding norms of judicial neutrality and a desire to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. (Of note: in 2020, Justice Elena Kagan did say she “lurks[s] on Twitter.”)
Although some close relatives of the justices maintain limited and largely private presences online, they are careful to maintain personal and professional identities without implicating the court. One notable exception is Ginni Thomas, the wife of Justice Clarence Thomas. In the aftermath of the 2020 presidential election, Thomas used social media and private communications to promote claims of election fraud and to urge political officials to take action related to the certification of the election results. Her outspoken online activity and broader political advocacy brought renewed attention to the potential risks posed by even indirect connections between the court and online discourse.
These activities, which became public through reporting and congressional investigation, sparked widespread debate over judicial ethics, recusal, and the extent to which a justice may be affected by the political conduct of a justices’ close family members. But, above all, they made one thing clear: while the justices themselves remain absent from social media, the realities of modern communication inevitably reach the court’s orbit.
Perceptions of social media at the high court
As for the court’s engagement with social media through its opinions, this has not amounted to any sort of unified doctrine, but a collection of various concerns that cut across ideological lines.
During oral argument in Moody v. NetChoice in 2024, for example, Justice Amy Coney Barrett candidly acknowledged that the regulatory landscape surrounding digital platforms makes her “a little bit nervous.” That hesitation was not simply about the novelty of this medium, but about the difficulty of applying traditional First Amendment frameworks to a space shaped by private actors, algorithmic enhancement, and global reach. This in turn has led the court to question how far regulation can – or should – go in such a rapidly developing area.
In Biden v. Knight First Amendment Institute, decided in 2021, a GVR (grant, vacate, and remand) decision, Thomas, in a concurring opinion, suggested that dominant social media companies may function as “common carriers,” and raised alarms about their ability to control access to speech in what increasingly resembles a modern public square. In contrast, the court’s other members have tended to focus more on social media as a source of misinformation and real-world harm, emphasizing the risks of under-regulation. At a 2021 event, Justice Sonia Sotomayor warned that the digital information ecosystem poses an “extraordinary challenge” to how Americans receive news. At the same event, Justice Neil Gorsuch echoed those concerns, emphasizing that misinformation can erode democratic stability from within – highlighting that anxieties about social media’s impact on democracy are not confined to one ideological perspective but reflect a broader, bipartisan concern. Building on this theme, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson in 2024 suggested that an overly rigid application of the First Amendment could “hamstring” the government’s ability to respond to harmful content, particularly in high-stakes contexts like public health crises.
Social media among judges not on the Supreme Court
The justices’ concerns have played out, albeit in very different ways, throughout the judiciary. Although, as noted, the Supreme Court’s engagement with social media has been sparing (to put it lightly), that is not the case with the judiciary in general.
For federal judges, there isn’t a defined code of conduct explicitly for social media, though judges are supposed to uphold the same standard online that they would in person. In many states, however, judges are generally permitted under codes of conduct to operate on social media within carefully constructed ethical frameworks that prioritize impartiality, restraint, and public confidence. In Texas, the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct permits online engagement so long as judges avoid political activity, public commentary on pending cases, and any conduct that undermines the judiciary’s integrity. Similarly, Illinois allows judges to maintain a presence on platforms like Facebook or LinkedIn but cautions against connections or communications that could suggest bias or improper influence. California takes a slightly different approach, explicitly recognizing social media as a permissible tool for outreach while warning against ex parte communications and online interactions with attorneys or litigants. And New York emphasizes an “appearance of impropriety” standard, instructing judges to use social media cautiously to avoid any perception that their neutrality could be compromised. Taken together, these jurisdictions reflect a consistent principle: social media is not prohibited, but it is tightly regulated so as not to damage judicial legitimacy.
With this in mind, some state court judges are beginning to explore how digital platforms can translate complex legal processes into accessible information. Georgia Court of Appeals Judge Stephen Dillard, for instance, recently argued that social media, when used carefully, offers a way for judges to explain procedures, highlight court operations, and humanize the judicial role without compromising judicial impartiality. In this sense, judges can act as interpreters not only of the law, but “legalese” itself, making the work of the courts more transparent and understandable to the communities they serve.
This is not without its dangers, somewhat highlighted by the example of former Texas Supreme Court Justice Don Willett. Prior to becoming a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, Willett was widely known for his active and often engaging presence on social media, using Facebook and X (then Twitter) to promote civic education and make the judiciary more accessible to laypersons. But during his 2017 nomination to the circuit court, Don Willett’s social media presence – though widely regarded as humorous and accessible – subjected him to increased scrutiny. That attention highlighted a broader concern that even well-intentioned, informal posts can be removed from their original context and, in a judicial setting, raise questions about impartiality and judicial bias. In response, Willett indicated that he would step back from social media use as a federal judge to avoid any potential issues and to preserve the appearance of neutrality.
Other judges have demonstrated how social media can be used to meaningfully enhance public trust in the judiciary. One of the most prominent examples is Rhode Island Judge Frank Caprio, whose courtroom clips – widely circulated on platforms like Facebook and YouTube – have reached millions of viewers. Through these videos, Caprio explains legal outcomes in plain language, often emphasizing fairness, compassion, and judicial discretion. In doing so, Caprio has acted as a bridge between the public and the often-opaque language of the law, reinforcing the idea that social media, when used thoughtfully, can strengthen confidence in judicial institutions rather than undermine it.
At the same time, more recent examples illustrate how digital and visual communication can raise new concerns. In a dissent in Duncan v. Bonta, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit Judge Lawrence VanDyke included a self-produced video demonstrating firearm mechanics – an unusual form of judicial expression that circulated widely online. VanDyke framed this as an effort to clarify the factual basis of his argument. Critics, however, dismissed it as a stunt, which cheapened the judiciary. Earlier this year, Delaware Chancery Court Chancellor Kathaleen McCormick reassigned several cases involving Elon Musk after Musk’s attorneys alleged that her LinkedIn activity reflected bias against him. The controversy stemmed from a LinkedIn “support” reaction tied to a post celebrating Musk’s loss in separate litigation (McCormick denied any bias and stated she may not have intentionally engaged with the post). Both incidents demonstrated how online activity can generate intense scrutiny and complicate public perceptions of judicial impartiality in the digital age.
The Supreme Court and the online world
As the examples above demonstrate, the judiciary’s engagement with social media has begun, even if it is still in its infancy. And whether it likes it or not, the Supreme Court cannot remain immune from this. This is especially true as Millennials and Gen Z, many of whom have lived much of their life on social media, come to fully dominate the legal profession – and eventually the judiciary itself.
So where does this leave us?
First, as some state courts have done, the justices should adopt official, nonpartisan social media channels to provide plain-language summaries of opinions, highlight oral arguments, and explain procedural developments. Such an approach would enhance transparency without compromising judicial neutrality or inviting the risks associated with personal commentary. Judge Caprio provides a great example here, explaining his opinions and courts processes in plain language while avoiding any partisan or inflammatory rhetoric.
Second, justices’ family members should remain free to express themselves online without being pressured into silence due solely to their proximity to the court. A justice should not automatically be viewed as endorsing or aligning with every statement, opinion, or post made by a spouse, child, or other relative, particularly where the activity is personal, nonpolitical, or unrelated to matters before the court. At the same time, situations involving direct political advocacy, active involvement in matters connected to pending litigation, or online activity that creates a substantial appearance of bias may reasonably raise serious ethical and recusal concerns.
Third, and perhaps most controversially, I would encourage Supreme Court justices to go beyond purely institutional communication and, within appropriate ethical boundaries, use social media to express limited aspects of their personality and public identity. While official court accounts can improve transparency and procedural understanding, carefully managed personal accounts could help make the judiciary appear more human and accessible to the public. For example, justices could share educational interests, civic initiatives, historical reflections on the court, or moments from public events that allow the public to better understand the individuals behind the institution. At a time when many Americans perceive the judiciary as distant or opaque, this type of measured personal engagement could strengthen public trust by reinforcing that even those on the highest court are not abstractions, but flesh-and-blood public servants operating within the realities of modern civic life.
The question is not whether social media will shape public understanding of the judiciary – it already does – but whether the courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, will play an active role in informing that understanding or remain defined by it from the outside.